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The Doha Round of multilateral trade negotiations in the World 
Trade Organization (WTO) was suspended indefinitely in late 
July 2006 after a succession of failed attempts to reach agree-
ment on the modalities for cutting farm subsidies and tariffs. 
Trade ministers are now consulting on how to put the WTO talks 
back on track. Without a rapid return to active negotiations, US 
officials may be relegated to the sidelines in Geneva due to the 
expiration of US trade promotion authority (TPA)—leaving the 
Doha Round adrift possibly until the next US administration 
takes office in 2009 or even longer.
Reviving and completing the Doha Round will pose signifi-
cant challenges for all the major trading nations in the WTO. 
Breaking the impasse on agriculture is critical, but success will 
be possible only if negotiations in other important areas of the 
WTO agenda—particularly services and nonagricultural market 
access (NAMA)—yield big results. This policy brief examines 
the causes of the ongoing negotiating problems and what needs 
to be done to restart the WTO talks.
What’s the Problem and Who’s to blame?
Nobody ever said meeting the ambitious and ambiguous goals of 
the Doha Round was going to be easy. Putting that package together 
has become even more difficult since the start of the Doha Round 
because of both the changing context in which the talks have taken 
place and the way in which the talks have been conducted.
Context 
The  global  economic  and  political  environment  has  become 
increasingly unsettled, creating new challenges to the completion 
of the trade negotiations. In addition, the foreign policy impera-
tive to work together—which solidified global support to start 
the Doha Round two months after the tragic terrorist attacks of 
September 11, 2001—has frayed amid frictions over US policy in 
Iraq, increasing competitive pressures from China, and renewed 
concerns about energy security and nuclear proliferation.
The biggest economic challenge is how to redress global 
economic imbalances—with the US current account deficit now 
exceeding 7 percent of GDP and China running an even higher 
surplus as a share of its economy—before they provoke exten-
sive protectionist responses in the United States and Europe. 
Remedies must include large doses of fiscal reform in the United 
States and currency revaluation in East Asia. Otherwise, new US 
and  European  trade  and  investment  restrictions  could  fatally 
sideswipe the trade negotiations and spur a vicious cycle of tit-
for-tat retaliation by the targeted countries.
The second challenge is how to focus Europe on new trade 
liberalization.  European  Union  member  states  continue  to 
grapple with the impact and adjustment pressures generated by 
enlargement and with implementing the structural reforms of 
the Lisbon Agenda. Antidumping measures are being deployed 
with increasing frequency to blunt import growth from East 
Asia, particularly textiles, apparel, and footwear. At the same 
time, investment policies are being contorted to develop and 
protect “national champions” in manufacturing and services.
A similar set of problems confronts US trade officials, although 
the source of the tension is different. In the United States, record 
trade deficits have contributed to weakening political support for 
trade liberalization and subsidy reform. China bashing dominates 
US trade politics, driven by a US bilateral deficit with China that 
exceeded $200 billion in 2005. While legislation calling for an 
import surcharge of 27.5 percent on shipments from China has 
been dropped, members of Congress and much of the US business 
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community still rail about the undervaluation of the renminbi. 
The next Congress will likely return to this issue with more 
targeted and viable legislative proposals.
Finally, as one would expect, the countries that stand to 
gain the most from the Doha Development Agenda also face 
the toughest adjustments. In many developing countries, poli-
cymakers are already having problems adapting to the current 
competitive environment and are extremely reluctant to add to 
their adjustment burden by committing to new trade reforms. 
Even if they didn’t have to worry about competition from 
China, many of them would be unsure whether they could 
take advantage of new trading opportunities due to infrastruc-
ture and human capital constraints. These legitimate concerns 
underscore the need to follow through on trade facilitation 
reforms  in  the  Doha  Round  and  complementary  commit-
ments to “aid for trade” to strengthen economic infrastructure 
and administrative capabilities.1
Conduct of the Negotiations 
The negotiations themselves have been badly orchestrated and 
conducted. WTO members have only a handful of achieve-
ments to show for almost five years of effort, and even this 
limited progress will be voided unless the overall Doha Round 
accord is significantly improved. The slow pace of the talks 
stems, at least in part, from (1) negotiating proposals and 
tactics deployed by individual countries and regional coali-
tions, (2) ill-conceived provisions in ministerial mandates, and 
(3) the WTO’s mercantilist negotiating ethic. 
National/Coalition  Positions.  A  large  number  of  countries 
deserve blame for the current impasse in the Geneva talks. The 
United States and the European Union have been reticent to 
offer significant changes in their current programs, particularly 
in agriculture. China has kept a low profile not befitting its status 
as one of the world’s largest economies and trading nations and 
has not offered additional reforms beyond the extensive commit-
ments undertaken in its 2001 protocols of accession. Japan has 
sought  to  advance  talks  on  cutting  tariffs  on  manufactured 
goods but has hampered overall progress in the Doha Round 
by defending its protectionist farm policies and seeking large 
exceptions in agricultural tariff cuts. Finally, India has focused on 
blocking farm reforms in developing countries, even though the 
resulting negotiating impasse hurts its chances of wresting new 
access for its competitive exports of services. Together, these are 
the key players in the Doha Round, representing more than half 
of world merchandise trade and more than 3.2 billion people.
1. For an analysis of the benefits of trade facilitation for economic develop-
ment, see Wilson, Mann, and Otsuki (2003).
Developing-country  coalitions  also  deserve  criticism. 
These large and diverse groups proffer requests of what they 
want developed countries to do for them, including special 
and differential treatment, but cannot reach consensus among 
themselves on what they should contribute to advance the 
WTO talks as well as their own development objectives. In 
that  regard,  it  is  particularly  troubling  that  many  of  these 
countries have failed to recognize the critical importance of 
services reforms to bolster productivity in their agricultural 
and manufacturing sectors. These countries need to undertake 
reforms for development purposes whether or not required 
by WTO accords and should be assisted in their efforts by 
accelerated  disbursements  of  “aid  for  trade”  commitments 
by developed countries (once the Doha Round talks revive). 
Whether they should also be obligated to bind such changes in 
their WTO schedules is another matter—and should depend 
on economic conditions in each particular country.
In addition, the trade negotiators themselves deserve some 
demerits. The “blame game” has been a persistent and degrad-
ing sideshow throughout the Doha Round, with dueling US-
EU press conferences and desultory charges from developing 
countries substituting for honest reciprocal bargaining. To be 
sure, the damage from such verbal abuses can be remedied.2 
More worrisome is the thought that these demarches mask 
political reluctance by major developed and developing trad-
ing nations to negotiate trade reforms. But political leaders 
have really not yet been challenged to change existing policies 
in response to offers from other countries—and that won’t 
happen until trade diplomats transcend general discussions 
on frameworks for negotiations and start talking about how 
concrete problems will be resolved.
Ministerial Mandates. Some of the Doha Round problems 
arise  from  ill-conceived  promises  inserted  in  ministerial 
declarations. The most obvious example is the awkward title 
of the talks themselves. Proclaiming the “Doha Development 
Agenda” was perhaps meant to stress the trade and develop-
ment objective embodied in the preamble of the WTO (and 
the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade [GATT] before 
it) and to give priority to reform of trade barriers of interest to 
developing countries. But some countries have misconstrued 
the  objective  to  mean  nonreciprocity  by  developing  coun-
tries and to justify demands for financial compensation for 
distortions  caused  by  developed-country  trade  barriers  and 
2. Former US Trade Representative (USTR) Robert Zoellick, for example, 
recanted his post-Cancún diatribe against “can’t do” countries by initiating 
global consultations and augmenting US offers in early 2004.  These efforts 
revived the Doha Round, which had seized up after the failed WTO ministe-
rial in Cancún in September 2003, and contributed to the Geneva Framework 
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subsidies. A number of developing countries have held back 
from reciprocal bargaining to redress the “balance of conces-
sions” that was heavily skewed against them in the Uruguay 
Round and to unravel some of the rule-making obligations—
such as those in the Agreement on Trade-Related Aspects of 
Intellectual Property Rights (TRIPS)—whose implementation 
imposed extensive burdens on resource-strapped governments. 
At the Cancún ministerial in September 2003, these countries 
used  the  new  leverage  of  the  WTO’s  “single  undertaking” 
to streamline the negotiating agenda (excluding investment, 
competition policy, and transparency in government procure-
ment) and to emphasize concerns about trade in cotton and 
access to medicines.
At  the  same  time,  the  predominance  given  to  agricul-
ture—almost  to  the  exclusion  of  talks  on  other  important 
issues like services—has been a major mistake. Officials have 
argued that the focus on agricultural issues is because of the 
lack of progress in prior rounds and the potential welfare gains 
for developing countries that could result from subsidy and 
market access reforms by developed countries. A series of stud-
ies by World Bank economists buttress such positions (see, for 
example, Anderson and Martin 2005). Those analyses, however, 
exclude the effects of services reforms that may be required for 
the successful exploitation of new trading opportunities. More 
attention needs to be given to this matter both in the services 
negotiations and in the work of the new negotiating group on 
trade facilitation (see Wilson, Mann, and Otsuki 2005).
Finally, the Geneva and Hong Kong ministerial declara-
tions  have  accepted  generous  carveouts  from  liberalization 
requirements for special and sensitive agricultural products 
and sensitive industrial products. “Special” and “sensitive” are 
not defined but can be readily recognized as products protect-
ed by high tariffs, quotas, and subsidies. Such early “conces-
sions” have resulted in strong pressure on developing-country 
negotiators to use the loopholes, even if they block or defer 
needed adjustments in the economy. While there is a clear 
justification for crafting schedules that help manage the adjust-
ment burdens in developing countries, including by extending 
the transition period for implementing “less than formula” 
liberalization,  such  open-ended  exceptions  have  further 
muddied  the  waters  of  the  WTO  talks  and  inhibited  the 
process of reciprocal bargaining.
WTO’s  Mercantilist  Ethic.  Doha  Round  negotiators  have 
followed a time-honored and perverse Geneva tradition: They 
label as “concessions”—and demand compensation for—offers 
to reduce distortions in their own economies. Under this form 
of negotiating calculus, the best result is to open foreign markets 
without changing domestic policies. To be sure, such seman-
tic  gymnastics  have  a  logical  political  economy  explanation.
As  any  good  trade  negotiator  knows,  WTO  members 
engage in trade talks to achieve both domestic and interna-
tional  objectives.  In  the  traditional,  mercantilist  sense,  the 
aim is to increase exports—and that is how trade deals still 
are marketed to national legislatures. But even more impor-
tant is the goal to increase imports to help dampen inflation, 
increase competition, and spur productivity in the economy. 
Indeed, WTO accords often are sought to help advance or 
lock  in  domestic  policy  reforms,  such  as  the  reduction  in 
trade-distorting farm subsidies.
An open secret of trade policy is that much of the gains 
that a country can garner from trade negotiations result from 
changes made to one’s own trade barriers. But the economist’s 
simple prescription for economic health often cannot be filled 
due to domestic political opposition from interest groups that 
derive rents from trade protection and subsidies. Given these 
political constraints, trade officials need help from their trad-
ing partners to allow them to undertake the reforms needed 
to enhance economic growth. This is true both in developed 
and developing countries—though the reform task is more 
urgent  and  more  intractable  in  developing  countries  given 
their development status and the adjustment burdens these 
countries already face in an era of globalization.
That said, the Doha Round won’t move forward until 
negotiators stop asking their counterparts, “What can you do 
for me?” and address instead the more complementary task of 
“How can you help me undertake reform of my own policies 
so we both can achieve our development objectives?”
Can the doha round and us trade 
Promotion authority be extended?
The  problems  mentioned  above  have  contributed  to  slow-
paced  and  unproductive  negotiations  and  to  the  political 
frustration that provoked the breakdown of the Doha Round 
in July 2006. Normally such an event would presage only a 
momentary reprieve in the trade negotiations. Trade pundits 
acknowledge that previous trade rounds have “failed” before 
they  ultimately  succeeded.  The  problem  in  this  instance, 
however, is that the lengthy deliberations have squandered 
the time allotted to US negotiators to pursue the WTO talks 
under US TPA.
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The Doha Round cannot be completed under the current 
TPA. The US Trade Act of 2002, which includes TPA, requires 
the president to notify the Congress by December 2006 if he 
intends to offer amendments to the trade remedy laws (anti-
dumping, countervailing duty, and escape clause legislation) 
and by April 2007 if he intends to sign an agreement. Any 
agreement so notified and signed before June 30, 2007, can 
then take advantage of the crucial “fast-track” features of the 
TPA law: A congressional vote up or down within 90 days after 
implementing legislation is submitted, with no amendments. 
Even if talks restart by year-end 2006, it would be impossible 
to meet these legislative deadlines.
To complete the Doha Round, US officials will have to 
request that Congress extend TPA for at least a year or two, 
but to do so the Bush administration will need to demonstrate 
progress in the trade talks to justify congressional support. US 
officials, and the world trading system more broadly, face a real 
“chicken and egg” problem: The Doha Round cannot be revived 
without new US concessions, but US officials cannot make new 
offers and garner congressional support to renew TPA without 
new proposals from other major trading nations. 
If TPA expires, US negotiators will be more cautious in 
WTO talks about offering to revise current US laws or regula-
tions; in turn, US trading partners will be more reticent to put 
good offers on the table in light of the US offers and the risk 
that Congress will require that negotiations be reopened and 
further concessions provided. Most likely, without TPA the 
Doha Round will go into hibernation.
Extending TPA won’t be easy. Congress remains evenly 
split on trade issues, and the slim protrade majority in the 
House of Representatives could fall victim to the November 
2006 mid-term elections. White House officials and business 
lobbyists fear that reauthorization of TPA would revisit the 
fractious battle in the summer of 2005 over the ratification 
of the Central American Free Trade Agreement (CAFTA) and 
would have to be fought in 2007 without two of the most 
tough-fisted Republican leaders in the House (former Majority 
Leader Tom DeLay and Ways and Means Committee Chair-
man Bill Thomas). If the Democrats gain control of either or 
both Houses of Congress, the administration will have to deal 
with new chamber and committee leadership whose commit-
ment and capacity to lead on trade policy is uncertain at best.   
Trade policy could be held hostage until the next administra-
tion (when the Democrats hope to regain the White House). 
Such an outcome would not serve US economic interests and 
should be avoided by leaders of both parties.
Regardless of the electoral outcome, the Bush administra-
tion will have to spend political capital to rebuild the bipar-
tisan protrade coalition in Congress or live without TPA and 
possibly relegate trade initiatives to the back burner for the rest 
of its term. However, to pass high-profile trade legislation like 
TPA, Republicans will need to attract a few dozen Democratic 
votes to offset protectionist members of their own caucus. To 
that end, Republicans will have to address concerns and inter-
ests of protrade Democrats, who have defected en masse on 
major trade votes in recent years in response to highly partisan 
legislative politics. 
Assuming the Bush administration decides to pursue the 
renewal of TPA—since without TPA its trade policy would 
be severely constrained—it will probably have to wait until 
after  the  new  Congress  convenes  in  January  2007.  Action 
in a lame-duck session in late 2006 would be difficult: The 
session is short, and other trade issues (such as extension of the 
generalized system of preferences [GSP] program, the Andean 
Trade Preferences Act, and the Africa Growth and Opportu-
nity Act)—that are less contentious and action on which is 
time sensitive—probably will be given priority. 
What needs to be done to renew TPA? In my view, the 
political recipe involves a combination of ingredients.
First, the Bush administration will have to demonstrate 
that large benefits are in the offing from both the Doha Round 
and big new free trade agreements (FTAs) under negotiation 
(especially  initiatives  with  Korea  and  Malaysia).  For  that 
reason, reviving the Doha talks, and upping the ante of WTO 
offers, is a critical prerequisite for congressional consideration 
of TPA.
Second, the Bush administration needs to emphasize the 
foreign policy cost of disengaging or downgrading regional 
trade initiatives already in train in the Middle East, Southeast 
and East Asia, and Latin America. US trade initiatives usually 
involve pursuit of a range of economic and foreign policy 
goals,  including  the  strengthening  of  democratic  processes 
and support for antiterrorist programs, and have been used 
to cement political alliances with strategic trading partners 
(Schott 2004, chapter 13). 
Third, the Bush administration needs to add a package of 
legislative “sweeteners” including support for a short-term exten-
sion of the current farm bill, enhanced health care and pension 
benefits for displaced workers, and other improvements to trade 
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adjustment assistance programs.3 The risk of such an approach, 
of course, is that some members of Congress will demand that 
other controversial issues be included in the package or that the 
use of TPA for future implementing bills be conditioned on the 
inclusion of certain provisions (e.g., labor) or the exclusion of 
others (e.g., changes in trade remedy laws).4
In any event, new legislation will likely present additional 
challenges to the Doha Round beyond the extension of gener-
ous US farm subsidies. Will the Bush administration be willing 
to pay the price to renew TPA in terms of US policy reforms 
sought by foreign trading partners and congressional Demo-
crats? No decision has been taken, nor will the issue come to a 
head before the mid-term election. But it is hard to see how the 
White House would agree to pay for TPA unless US trading 
interests stand to gain significantly from the prospective trade 
initiatives. Bluntly put, TPA is dead unless the Doha Round 
and big bilateral trade talks promise to deliver a substantial 
package of reforms in agriculture, manufactures, and services 
that create concrete trade and investment opportunities for 
US firms, workers, and farmers.
What needs to be done? and Who 
needs to do it?
The adage “good things come in small packages” may apply 
when buying a Christmas present for your spouse, but “good 
things don’t come in small packages” for trade negotiators. 
The Doha Round won’t be revived unless the major trading 
nations increase the ante at the bargaining table, which will be 
a challenge for both developed and developing countries.
Unlike past rounds, the United States and the European 
Union have much less to offer except for the politically sensitive 
subsidies and border restrictions that have survived eight previ-
ous liberalization assaults in GATT rounds. To get political 
support for changes in their long-standing trade barriers, US 
and EU officials will need to bring home agreements that offer 
substantial new trading opportunities, primarily in develop-
ing countries that still maintain high border barriers to trade. 
Anything less and politicians will opt for the status quo. 
Unlike past rounds, many developing countries have (1) 
a real stake in the bargaining process and—like the United 
States and the European Union—will have to take home some 
3. To be sure, no package of “sweeteners” may be sweet enough to those politi-
cians seeking strategic advantage in the 2008 US presidential election.
4. In that regard, a new TPA debate also could provoke internecine debate 
on trade and immigration policy—a divisive issue both between parties and 
within the Republican caucus—since a Doha Round deal on services will 
probably have to include at least narrowly drawn offers to increase trade in 
temporary labor services.  
trophies from Geneva to get their governments to approve 
their own trade reforms and (2) leverage to push their own 
export interests. The single undertaking gives them a stick in 
the closet; like most sticks, it is most valuable if threatened 
but not used. They will not and should not accept a deal that 
does not increase access to foreign markets for their goods and 
services and decrease actual disbursements of farm subsidies 
by industrial countries.
Accordingly, a successful Doha Round will have to include 
a big package of market access reforms to accommodate the 
interests of both developed and developing countries. That 
outcome is still a long way off.
To date, the proposals put forward by the major trading 
nations would not result in substantial cuts in applied tariffs, 
in current levels of disbursements of farm subsidies, or in trade 
and investment barriers to services. Moreover, no one is sure 
what these offers are worth, since it is unclear whether—and 
if so how—the offers will be applied to products currently 
benefiting  from  high  levels  of  protection  or  subsidy.  Each 
country wants to provide exceptions from the general liberal-
ization formulas for “sensitive products” so that key domestic 
constituencies are shielded from the reforms. Extensive resort 
to such exceptions (either via outright exemption or more 
limited reform) would substantially hollow out the content 
of the agreements. In short, the current proposals need to 
be substantially improved to produce a result that provides 
politicians the quid pro quo for their difficult votes to reform 
long-standing trade barriers and subsidy programs.
The negotiating process has seized up because key nego-
tiators have not led by example and challenged their colleagues 
by proposing concrete changes in current policies that would 
open new opportunities for trade and investment. Each “lead-
er” of the trading system says his or her counterpart must do 
more before another offer is put on the table.
The best way out of this “chicken and egg” problem is for 
the main developed and developing trading nations to move in 
tandem and in expectation of reciprocal offers from the bulk 
of the WTO membership. Consultations among key WTO 
members already have been held in Southeast Asia, Brazil, and 
Australia on how to revive the Doha Round, and more sessions 
are scheduled through the Asia Pacific Economic Cooperation 
forum (APEC) ministerial in mid-November 2006. By that 
time, US officials may face a decision point on TPA, especially 
if the mid-term elections go badly for the Republicans, so it 
is particularly important that the WTO talks revive and show 
some progress at that point.
To  do  so,  each  of  the  key  players  will  need  to  ante 
up new offers in a coordinated manner that can then be 
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APEC meetings in Hanoi would be a logical culmination 
of the consultative process that promotes a return to the 
negotiating table. Because APEC comprises most but not 
all the key trading nations, APEC trade ministers should 
invite several non-APEC countries, along with WTO Direc-
tor General Pascal Lamy, to join in a special session on the 
WTO during their annual meeting. The purpose should be 
to consult and coordinate on the new proposals that each 
will table in the Doha Round. 
Without delving into the fine print of what needs to be 
done, let me summarize what each key player needs to offer to 
craft a package of agreements that could balance the political 
needs of those countries with the development goals of the Doha 
Round. The caveat “easier said than done” is understood. 
The United States and the European Union both need 
to augment their WTO offers to catalyze movement by others. 
The United States has to make further cuts in farm support 
and open up trade in labor services, and the European Union 
has to do more on agricultural market access as well as indus-
trial tariffs and services. Specifically, overall trade-distorting 
subsidies provided to US and EU farmers should be reduced 
by 60 to 70 percent from WTO-bound levels and applied 
farm tariffs should be cut by more than half with very few 
exceptions.5 Most tariffs on manufactured goods should be 
eliminated (as the United States originally proposed in 2002), 
and none should be higher than 10 percent after a transition 
period.  In  addition,  both  need  to  make  narrowly  focused 
offers  on  temporary  provision  of  labor  services.6  In  many 
cases, US and EU reforms will not primarily benefit bilateral 
trade but rather respond to the priority demands of develop-
ing countries. But what the European Union does matters 
for the United States, and vice versa, even if the reforms do 
not largely benefit bilateral trade, since if each provides new 
opportunities for key developing countries, then those coun-
tries will reciprocate in areas of interest to the United States 
and the European Union. 
Major developing countries, especially Brazil, Mexico, 
and South Africa, need to make concrete offers to reduce 
current  levels  of  protection  for  goods  and  services  and  to 
provide poorer developing countries with preferential market 
access. Average industrial tariffs should be reduced below 10 
percent and bound at that level. In services, revised offers need 
to be put on the table that open new competitive opportuni-
ties in financial services, telecommunications, air transport, 
5. For a more detailed analysis of the Doha Round negotiations on agriculture, 
see Elliott (2006).
6. To be sure, offers on temporary provision of labor services will pose a large 
challenge to US officials since Congress has warned the USTR not to make 
offers that would alter US immigration policy.
and other distribution services. Several of the leading trading 
nations in the developing world already have accomplished 
much of this liberalization; they should now “lock in” these 
reforms to ensure a stable policy environment for trade and 
investment. Whether these countries will do so, of course, 
depends on how the United States and the European Union 
address their priority demands. 
China needs to contribute more than any other develop-
ing country and perhaps as much as industrial countries on 
market access for manufactured goods. Compared with other 
major trading nations, China has the most to lose from the 
collapse of the WTO system. China’s fast domestic growth rate 
depends on keeping its export engine running, which in turn 
requires an open world trading system.7 Moreover, as a practi-
cal matter, China’s trade barriers are already low compared with 
its peers (e.g., India and Brazil), so large percentage cuts in base 
tariff rates will translate into small changes in China’s applied 
tariffs.  Such  concessions—in  conjunction  with  significant 
appreciation of its currency—could yield important dividends: 
Contributing  more  than  most  developing  countries  would 
allow China to respond positively to protectionist pressures in 
Europe and the United States and would give China a political 
advantage in its relations with other developing countries.
India needs to do more to align its trade policies with 
its  overall  economic  development  strategy.  Prime  Minister 
Manmohan Singh has capped the more outrageous industrial 
tariffs, but in multilateral talks, India’s position has remained 
faithful to an earlier age where protection of agriculture and 
services  was  paramount.  Indian  demands  that  subsistence 
agriculture  be  sheltered  from  all  trade  accords  should  not 
mean an unwillingness to reform agricultural policies and to 
open competition to processed foodstuffs, nor should India 
continue to protect its generic pharmaceutical firms and a 
long list of monopoly service providers. Moreover, India now 
has an “offensive” agenda in the Doha Round to enhance the 
ability of multinational firms to outsource various operations, 
particularly tradable services, to Indian firms. When developed 
countries offer a more concrete deal on services, India should 
be able to reciprocate with deeper cuts in industrial tariffs and 
selective agricultural reforms.
In sum, the major trading nations in the developed and 
developing world need to dig deeper into their pockets and 
agree  to  implement  new  trade  reforms  that  will  promote 
economic growth at home and abroad. Overall, negotiations 
should yield the following:
7. China’s extensive network of FTAs is not a viable alternative since these 
pacts do not cover China’s major export markets (e.g., the United States and 
the European Union accounted for about 40 percent of Chinese exports in 
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• In agriculture, farm export subsidies should be phased 
out by 2013 as promised; the overall level of trade-distorting 
farm subsidies should be cut by 60 to 70 percent, with de 
minimis allowances cut to 1 percent of the value of produc-
tion; and farm tariffs should be more than halved in devel-
oped countries and reduced by one-third in developing coun-
tries—with limited exceptions for sensitive products linked to 
higher minimum import access requirements and tariff caps 
no higher than 100 percent.
• For manufactures, tariffs should be slashed in developed 
countries (with most tariffs bound at zero) and applied tariffs 
reduced by at least 30 percent in major developing countries 
(including China). 
• Services negotiations probably require the biggest effort 
to upgrade the sparse offers proposed to date, particularly in the 
area of financial, telecommunications, distribution, and “mode 
4” labor services. In this area, for a deal to come together, indus-
trial countries will need developing-country commitments to 
reform in infrastructure services (e.g., banking, insurance, tele-
com, and air transport), while developing countries expect new 
opportunities to provide labor-oriented services (e.g., health 
care, construction, and basic information technology services). 
Satisfying both camps will require the elimination of national-
istic rules on establishment and governance and the reform of 
regulation that fosters incumbent suppliers.
If ministerial-level consultations progress to the point 
by the APEC meetings that such a package is feasible, then 
Pascal Lamy should invite WTO members back to Geneva 
in  early  2007  for  an  intensive  series  of  negotiations  on 
agriculture, NAMA, and services. That would be the time 
as well for him to unveil a new “Lamy Draft”—drawing 
on  the  extensive  efforts  already  undertaken  by  chairs  of 
the negotiating groups—that provides specific guidance to 
WTO member countries on crafting the final Doha Round 
package of agreements.
What if the doha deal does 
not Get done?
For those who think the above proposal is too ambitious or 
too imbalanced, or doubt that the US Congress will extend 
TPA and thus expect the WTO talks to drift indefinitely, I 
conclude with a summary accounting of the prospective costs 
of failure of the Doha Round. The alternative to a success-
ful multilateral negotiation is not the status quo ex ante but 
rather a serious degradation in the trading system.
It’s fairly easy to classify the downside risks of a failure of 
the Doha Round, even if it’s difficult to quantify the extent of 
the losses.
The first loss would be forgone welfare gains from new 
WTO  reforms.  If  one  posited  the  outcomes  modeled  by 
economists at the World Bank and leading universities, the 
expected benefits would range from about $50 billion to several 
hundred billion dollars. These numbers are both too large and 
too small, since many of the models assume too much change 
in tariffs and subsidies and too little change in regulatory poli-
cies affecting service industries compared with what would be 
contained in an acceptable Doha Round accord.
The second cost would be systemic erosion. The WTO 
would not implode but rather begin a slow descent into obliv-
ion. The poorest and weakest members, who benefit the most 
from a strong multilateral rules-based system, would be the 
most disadvantaged. To be sure, members still would adhere to 
obligations under existing agreements. But there would be less 
confidence in using the WTO as a forum for trade negotia-
tions—why spend the effort when the process yields so little? 
On the other hand, there would be more emphasis on WTO 
litigation in the absence of an effective “legislative” process to 
liberalize trade and augment the world trading rules. Devel-
oping countries likely would make more use of the dispute 
settlement process to “litigate” desired changes in the practices 
of other member countries—but big players would have less 
incentive to comply with adverse rulings.
The third cost would be increased regionalism—pursued 
in a way highly corrosive to the WTO system. Major trading 
nations would refocus their negotiating efforts on bilateral and 
regional trade agreements, and the number of such initiatives 
would proliferate—as occurred in the immediate aftermath of 
the failed WTO ministerial meeting in Cancún in September 
2003, which disrupted the Doha Round for months. Of course, 
there probably will be more regional initiatives whether or not 
the Doha Round succeeds. However, the explicit discrimina-
tion inherent in those pacts, along with the burdensome rules 
of origin required to qualify for the trade preferences, would 
become more onerous in the absence of the mitigating effect 
of complementary multilateral liberalization.
Even worse, preferential pacts between the richest countries 
could severely impair the trade of developing countries. In the 
past, most FTAs involved deals among developing countries or 
between major developed and developing countries. So-called 
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North-North FTAs were vetted but rejected because of their 
potentially adverse impact on the multilateral trading system. 
A Doha failure could change that calculus and prompt new 
FTAs among the major trading nations. Two initiatives seem 
possible under this scenario: a US-Japan FTA, in response to 
Chinese trade pacts in the region and the current Korea-US 
talks; and renewed interest in a Transatlantic FTA or TAFTA, 
which would be seen as a constructive response to growing 
protectionist  pressures  on  both  sides  of  the  Atlantic  and 
would be less offensive to labor interests than North-South 
deals. Such talks conceivably could proceed without TPA if 
the participants loosely interpret WTO obligations requiring 
coverage of “substantially all trade” and tread lightly on agri-
culture. Other countries would then seek comparable deals on 
a bilateral or regional basis.
The fourth cost would be increased protectionism. Trade 
rounds  act  as  a  buffer  against  protectionist  impulses  since 
blatant new trade barriers or subsidies could disrupt ongoing 
negotiations. Remove the constraint and countries could well 
deploy new protectionist measures in the coming years—chan-
neled through practices not subject to WTO disciplines. And, 
of course, this risk increases as the buoyant economic growth 
of the past five years begins to wane. What’s likely? New doses 
of regulatory protection, via sanitary/phytosanitary measures 
in agriculture and visa restrictions to block trade in services, 
plus  investment  restrictions  to  protect  national  security  or 
national  patrimony  (particularly  in  energy  and  transporta-
tion). Such measures could escalate in the future in response 
to slower growth and rising unemployment as the global boom 
of the past three years weakens amid high energy costs and 
associated inflation. Reactions to a new terrorist attack, bird 
flu pandemic, spike in oil prices, or other unforeseen events 
also could exacerbate latent protectionist tendencies.
Fifth, the breakdown of the trade talks could precipitate 
adverse shocks in financial markets. It’s not a coincidence that 
I often get calls from Wall Street when trade talks stall. Given 
the global economic imbalances noted above, markets already 
are sensitive to threats of new trade protectionism and their 
knock-on effects on capital flows. Concerns about exchange 
rate misalignments already weigh heavily on US-China trade 
relations; this problem could spread if the dollar adjustment 
needed to mitigate global imbalances falls disproportionately 
on the euro, prompting a surge in European protectionism.
Finally, and often ignored, is the opportunity cost for 
developing countries, particularly the least developed, of not 
being able to use the carrot and stick of multilateral trade 
negotiations to catalyze their own domestic economic reform. 
In other words, no help in dealing with the competitive chal-
lenge of globalization in general and China in particular.
In sum, the costs of failure in the WTO talks would be 
substantial. Many developing countries would suffer signifi-
cant losses, and the process of multilateral negotiation would 
be devalued, if not discredited. In contrast, while worse off, 
the costs to developed countries would be relatively small, and 
other trade initiatives could compensate some of those losses. 
But for most developing countries, including those who have 
been  most  demanding  and  least  forthcoming  in  the  Doha 
Round, there is no viable alternative to the WTO. Complet-
ing a comprehensive package of WTO trade accords should 
be the number one trade priority of developed and developing 
countries alike in 2007.
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